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insight	 for	 explaining	preference	 formation,	 actors’	 strategic	action,	 and	political	outcomes.	The	
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Introduction








already	given,	has	advantages	over	rational-choice	 institutionalism	when	it	comes	 to	 the	rectification	of	
inequalities,	historical-sociological	models	fail	to	provide	political	actors	with	opportunities	to	autonomously	



























actors	behave	within	particular	 institutional	settings	(i.e.,	 the	 rules)	and	desire	 to	attain	 their	objectives	
according	to	their	own	political	preferences.	In	this	sense,	 they	assume	that	preferences	of	political	actors	












functional	 institutions	are	restructured	to	reduce	transaction	costs	and	uncertainty.	This	 implies	 that,	once	
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Thompson	2004).



























































institutionalists,	on	 the	other	hand,	posit	 that	social	 ties	and	networks	construct	political	actions.	Mark	
Granovetter	(1985),	for	example,	argues	that	human	behavior	is	embedded	 in	the	structure	and	networks	of	
interpersonal	 social	 relationships.	Granovetter	 criticizes	 “undersocialized”	 economic	 theories	 that	
overemphasize	 the	maximization	of	 individuals’	self-interested	preferences,	pointing	out	 that	economic	
approaches	are	 implicitly	based	upon	 the	atomization	of	 the	 individual	and,	 thus,	 tend	 to	 ignore	social	






believe	 that	an	 individual’s	pursuit	of	personal	preferences	produces	radical	and	 incremental	changes	 in	
institutions	 (Cammack	1992),	historical	 institutionalists	believe	 that	 institutional	change	stems	from	an	
agent’s	logical	and	strategic	choices	in	a	path-dependent	environment	(Hay	and	Wincott	1998;	Peters	et	al.	
2005).	In	essence,	they	believe	that,	from	a	“critical	juncture”	or	a	“bifurcation	point,”	meaning	a	period	of	
significant	change	that	shifts	 the	 trajectories	of	policy	development	at	any	given	point	of	 time,	produces	
pressure	for	policy	changes	(Collier	and	Collier	1991;	Pierson	2000).	Similarly,	sociological	institutionalists	
argue	 that	 institutions	can	persist	over	a	period	of	 time	even	 if	existing	 institutional	arrangements	are	
dysfunctional,	 inefficient,	or	hinder	utilitarian	reasoning	(Cammack	1992).	Sociological	 institutionalism	
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in	a	context	of	the	long-standing	social	environment.
2.2.	Implications	for	inequalities
	 Based	on	 these	points,	 the	question	arises	on	what	 are	 the	 implications	of	historical-sociological	
institutionalism	on	 social	 inequalities.	First,	 it	must	be	noted	 that	 these	approaches	are	 substantially	
distinguished	from	ration-choice	models	 in	 that	historical-sociological	 institutionalists	posit	 that	political	
actors’	interests,	goals,	and	choices	are	not	given	a priori,	but	are	rather	historically	contingent	or	socially	
constructed.	The	crucial	difference	 lies	 in	 the	understanding	of	political	actors’	preference	 formation.	
According	 to	rational-choice	 institutionalists,	preferences	are	 fixed	and	exogenous	 to	 institutions,	while	
historical-sociological	 institutionalists	posit	 that	preferences	are	structured	by institutions.	 In	historical-
sociological	institutionalism,	institutions	are	not	mere	reflections	of	fixed	preferences	of	powerful	actors,	but	
rather	a	set	of	structured	rules,	such	as	norms,	conventions,	 routines,	beliefs,	and	values.	 In	 this	 regard,	




as	 increased	awareness	of	social	 inequalities,	attitudinal	shifts	about	existing	disadvantages	 in	a	society,	
prevalence	of	altruistic	values	and	behaviors,	or	an	experience	of	historical	change	transforming	the	state	





























of	 institutions	 to	 include	historical	and	sociological	factors.	However,	 these	models	still	 lack	an	inherent	
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actors	 to	 spontaneously	 change	 the	 rules	 and	preferences	 using	 the	 logic	 of	 social	 legitimacy	 and	
appropriateness	rather	than	merely	passively	expecting	“happy”	changes	in	historical	developments	or	social	
norms.	Indeed,	it	is	important	to	ensure	that	political	outcomes	accurately	reflect	the	preferences	of	agents	and	
assume	“the	greatest	happiness	of	 the	greatest	number.”	However,	what	 is	more	important	 is	whether	 the	
actors’	preferences	are	thoroughly	deliberated	before the	calculation	of	preferences.	The	deliberative	account	
of	 institutionalism	provides	agents	with	opportunities	 to	modify	and	change	their	preferences,	or,	at	 least,	
come	into	contact	with	differing	views	and	ideas,	and	ultimately	formulate	an	intersubjective	understanding	of	












voicing	 their	views	 fairly	and	effectively.	Representative	deliberators	also	have	opportunities	 to	pose	
questions	to	politicians	and	experts	participating	in	the	deliberative	forum.	After	deliberations,	participants	are	
polled	again	and	their	preferences	are	re-checked.	The	results	of	the	polling	are	broadcast	on	television.
	 According	 to	Fishkin	 (2004),	 there	were	significant	changes	 in	participants’	views	before	and	after	
deliberations	 in	each	deliberative	setting.	For	example,	 in	 the	Australian	Deliberative	Polling	held	on	
February	16-18,	2001,	 in	which	“Aboriginal	Reconciliation”	was	 the	 targeted	 issue,	 the	percentage	of	
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